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Potential Water Worlds:
Future Scenarios
The future of water and food is highly uncertain. Relatively uncontrollable fac-tors like weather are partially the cause but the fundamental policy choicesthat drive water and food supply and demand long-term are key to deter-
mining actual outcomes. Such policies address income and population growth,
investment in water supply, urban water systems, dams, irrigation, and other water
infrastructure; relative allocations of water to irrigation, domestic, industrial, and
environmental uses; reform of river basin, irrigation, and municipal and industrial
water management; water prices; and technological change in agriculture. Three pos-
sible futures for global water and food markets are presented in this and the next
two chapters. 
1) The business-as-usual scenario (BAU) projects the likely water and food out-
comes for a future trajectory based on the recent past, whereby current trends
for water investments, water prices, and management are broadly maintained. 
2) The water crisis scenario (CRI) projects deterioration of current trends and
policies in the water sector.
3) The sustainable water use scenario (SUS) projects improvements in a wide
range of water sector policies and trends.
SCENARIO ANALYSIS
A scenario is a coherent, internally consistent, and plausible description of a possi-
ble future state of the world (Carter et al. 1994). A scenario is not a forecast but
rather a snapshot of how the future could unfold. Scenario analysis of future out-
comes encompasses a wide range of methodological approaches from sensitivity
analysis—based on changes in one underlying variable within a single formal
model—to holistic qualitative scenarios that create a narrative from a logical plot
that governs the way events will unfold and then employ other models and quan-
titative tools, such as accounting frameworks and mathematical simulation mod-
els, to assess the quantitative aspects of the scenarios (Gallopin and Rijsberman
2001). 
The strength of sequential sensitivity analysis of specific underlying variables
within a single modeling framework is that it employs an internally consistent
framework allowing assessment of the individual contributions of important under-
lying variables on future outcomes. The strength of the broad-based holistic scenario
approach is that it incorporates quantitative insights from available data, numeri-
cal calculations, and mathematical models but also gives weight to the compre-
hensive underlying narrative and to key elements that are not quantifiable either in
principle—such as cultural influences, behavior, and institutional responses to
change—or in practice—as a result of inadequacies in data or scientific theory
(Gallopin and Rijsberman 2001). 
The analysis in our three primary scenarios represents a middle ground between
these two approaches. A broad-based narrative describes the projected policy, man-
agement, and investment environment underlying the changing drivers (variables)
explicitly represented in the model to provide a plausible backdrop of food and water
policy for each scenario. The projected changes in the explicit model drivers are then
quantified for each scenario.
The narratives developed in this book owe an intellectual debt to the water sce-
narios developed under the World Water Vision (Cosgrove and Rijsberman 2000);
they also differ in important respects. The WWV process used mostly qualitative
scenarios to help people think about future water worlds with selective quantitative
assessments playing a supporting role (Gallopin and Rijsberman 2001). The Water
Vision scenario narratives extend far beyond issues specific to water, including
lifestyle choices, technology, demographics, and economics (Raskin 2002). Certain
water and food related issues were then quantified using a variety of models—but
no single integrated modeling framework was used to generate full quantitative sce-
narios.  
Like the WWV scenarios, those here start with holistic narratives but we limit
the variables across scenarios (both in the narrative and in the model parameters)
to the underlying drivers that directly influence the water and food sectors.1 We
further limit the food sector variables to those directly related to water.2 This
method focuses the analysis on how policies, investments, and management
reform—specific to water—influence future outcomes for water and food. 
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SCENARIO NARRATIVES 
The primary drivers in the model are used as the building blocks for the scenarios.
The drivers were identified in the discussion of the model in Chapter 2 but are worth
summarizing here. 
! Economic and demographic drivers include population growth, rate of urbaniza-
tion, and rate of growth in GDP, and GDP per capita. The projected outcomes
on the economic and demographic drivers are held constant across scenarios. 
! Climate and hydrological parameters include precipitation, evapotranspiration,
runoff, and groundwater recharge. These are likewise held constant across the
three scenarios. 
! Technological, management, and infrastructural drivers include river basin effi-
ciency, reservoir storage, water withdrawal capacity, potential physical irrigated
area, and crop and animal yield growth.3
! Policy drivers include water prices, water allocation priorities among sectors, com-
mitted water flows for environmental purposes, interbasin water shares, com-
modity price policy as defined by taxes and subsidies on commodities. 
A wide range of actions can induce changes in the value of these drivers across
the business-as-usual, water crisis, and sustainable water use scenarios. The narra-
tives, next described, provide storylines of how these actions unfold and their qual-
itative impact on the model drivers. 
THE BUSINESS-AS-USUAL SCENARIO
The business-as-usual scenario (BAU) assumes a continuation of current trends and
existing plans in water and food policy, management, and investment.  Continued
complacency by international donors and national governments about agriculture
and irrigation results in continued declining investment in these sectors. Limited
and piecemeal implementation of institutional and management reform continues,
with only mixed success in both urban water supply and drainage systems and in
the irrigation sector. The combination of slowing investment and sporadic policy
reform results in only slow progress in meeting major challenges in the water and
food sectors.
In the food crop sector under BAU, both irrigated and rainfed harvested area
grow at a slow rate in most of the world over the coming decades. Given a high pro-
portion of land suitable for agricultural use is already being harvested and other fac-
tors such as urbanization, slow growth in irrigation investment, and soil degradation
hinder additional growth of harvested area, yield improvements are a larger source
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of the additional agricultural production. Cereal prices further affect crop area
expansion because steady or declining real cereal prices make it unprofitable to
expand harvested area.
This slow rate of area expansion causes production growth to be based prima-
rily on yield increases but crop yield growth also continues to slow. Slowing growth
in public investment in agricultural research and rural infrastructure over recent
decades continues into the future contributing to accompanying slowing yield
growth in many regions and for many commodities. The very success of the Green
Revolution in rice and wheat makes future crop yield gains for these crops more dif-
ficult because many sources of yield gains in recent decades are not readily repeat-
able—such as increasing crop-planting density through changes to plant
architecture, raising the weight of usable food product as a fraction of total plant
weight, introducing strains with greater fertilizer responsiveness, and improving
management practices. Moreover, in the most productive regions, high existing lev-
els of fertilizer use make it difficult to further boost yields through additional fer-
tilizer use.
In the water sector under BAU, river basin and irrigation water management
efficiency increase—but relatively slowly. At the mainstream level in most countries,
public agencies continue to manage bulk water distribution between sectors, as well
as primary irrigation canals. Technological innovations are introduced in some
major systems, particularly those facing growing water shortages. Such innovations
as real-time management of water releases from dams, keyed to telemetric moni-
toring of weather and streamflow conditions improve water use efficiency in some
water-scarce basins.  
Some river basins make progress toward more integrated river basin manage-
ment through establishment of river basin organizations (RBOs) that promote
greater stakeholder involvement, serve as a problem solving mechanism and pro-
vide a forum for dispute resolution. RBOs also facilitate information gathering and
exchange through standardization of data collection, initiation of water quality and
quantity monitoring, and the exchange of hydrologic and other information among
various stakeholder groups. But in many cases, the functions of organizations con-
stituting the RBO overlap and conflicts over coordination, disputes over budget-
ary authority, and loopholes in the laws and regulations cause serious problems.
Furthermore, decentralization of government functions in some countries causes a
breakdown in management at the river basin scale that transcends local and region-
al governments. These problems, combined with continued declines in operational
budgets for RBOs, result in relatively slow overall progress in integration of river
basin management.
Spurred by the often disappointing results achieved in publicly managed irri-
gation systems, by the expectation of benefits from decentralized management, and
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by the desire to transfer operations and maintenance cost to farmers to reduce
budget transfers, governments under BAU continue recent trends in turnover of irri-
gation to farmer organizations and water user associations. But the benefits of sys-
tem turnover continue to be mixed. System turnover is relatively successful and
contributes to water efficiency gains in those instances where it is built on existing
patterns of cooperation, backed by a supportive policy and legal environment that
includes establishing secure water rights and providing technical and organization-
al training and support. But just as often, these policy and legal supports are lack-
ing, and turnover has mixed success in improving management.  
Increasing water scarcity and gradual introduction of small water price increas-
es in some agricultural areas induce farmers in these regions to use water more effi-
ciently by adopting improved technology (such as furrow, sprinkler, and drip
irrigation) and improving onfarm water management. But continued political
opposition prevents vigorous implementation of economic incentives that could bet-
ter induce gains in water management and technology adoption. Opposition to pric-
ing arises both from concerns over the impact of higher prices on farm income and
from entrenched interests that benefit from existing systems of allocating water by
bureaucratic decisions. 
Water management also improves slowly in rainfed agriculture under BAU,
with effective water use for rainfed crops improving gradually. Advancements in
water harvesting and better onfarm management techniques— as well as some suc-
cess in the development of shorter duration crop varieties that allow crop growth
periods to shift to better utilize rainfall—lead to marginal enhancements in rainfall
use efficiency. But with little progress in effective water harvesting systems, the high
costs and labor constraints of implementing water harvesting prevents widespread
use. 
Public investment in irrigation expansion and reservoir storage continues to
decline as the capital costs of building new irrigation systems escalate and the prices
of cereals and other crop outputs of irrigation continue to decline. In addition to
the direct cost of new systems, concerns over high environmental and social costs,
including dislocation of persons displaced from dam and reservoir sites, results in
a slowdown in investment. Nevertheless, many governments proceed with con-
struction of dams where they judge benefit-cost ratios to be adequate. As a result,
reservoir storage and water withdrawal capacity for irrigation water increase at a
slow-to-moderate level in the coming decades.
However, with relatively slow growth in investment in expansion of potential
irrigated area from surface water and a failure to establish higher prices for pump-
ing of groundwater or to effectively regulate groundwater, farmers continue to
expand pumping from groundwater. As a result, regions that are currently pump-
ing groundwater at rates higher than recharge continue to do so. Unsustainable
groundwater pumping therefore continues in a number of basins in the western
United States, northern China, northern and western India, Egypt and other areas
in the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region under BAU. Groundwater
extraction continues to grow significantly in other basins as well.
Environmental and other interest groups continue to press for increased allo-
cation of water for environmental and instream uses including supplying water to
wetlands, diluting pollutants, maintaining riparian flora and other aquatic species,
and for tourism and recreation. With the relatively slow progress in policy reform
and in improving basin water use efficiency, however, the need for water for domes-
tic, industrial, and agricultural uses remains high, and no increases are given in com-
mitted environmental water allocations relative to total renewable water.  
As in the irrigation sector, the cost of supplying water to domestic and indus-
trial users also increases dramatically under BAU, with new supplies coming on
stream at two to three times the cost per liter of existing water supplies. Improvement
in the delivery and efficiency of use in the domestic sector is relatively slow but does
lead to some increase in the proportion of households connected to piped water.
However, the number of unconnected households remains large. With industrial
water use intensity in developing countries three times as high as in developed coun-
tries in 1995, substantial room exists for conserving water supplies as industrializa-
tion proceeds. After a first use, freshwater can be recycled in the same home or
factory, or wastewater can be collected, treated, and redistributed for use in anoth-
er location. Industrial water use intensity drops in response to small price increas-
es, improved pollution-control regulation and enforcement, and improved
technology transferred through new industrial plants and retrofitted into many older
plants. Significant additional potential gains are, however, foregone because indus-
trial water prices remain relatively low and pollution regulations are often not
enforced.
THE WATER CRISIS SCENARIO
BAU shows a mixed picture combining some successes with worrying trends. The
water crisis scenario (CRI) examines the impact of a deterioration of current trends
in water and food policy and investment. Moderate deterioration of many of these
trends builds sufficiently to tip the scale to genuine water crisis. 
Under CRI, government budget problems worsen and competing claims on
slowly growing revenues draw funds away from the water sector, resulting in dra-
matic government cuts on irrigation systems expenditures and accelerated turnover
of irrigation systems to farmers and farmer groups, devolving O&M to water users.
But this rapid turnover is not accompanied by the necessary reform of water rights
and often fails to gain support. At the same time prices for water delivery to 
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secondary canals increase in an attempt to fund administrative and O&M delivery
costs in the main system. Water users fight price increases, and a high degree of con-
flict translates to lack of local water-user cooperation about cost-sharing arrange-
ments. With public investments declining, devoid of compensating increases in
farmer and community funding, expenditures on O&M for secondary and terti-
ary systems similarly decline dramatically. Rapidly deteriorating infrastructure and
poor management reduce system-level and basin-level water use efficiency.
Concomitant with the failure of decentralized management, central manage-
ment also loses capability. Attempts to develop integrated river basin management
by establishing RBOs fail from lack of funding from both general revenues and fee
collections from water delivery, and because of high levels of conflict among water
stakeholders within the basin as water scarcity grows.  
National budget constraints and declining international interest in agriculture
result in further declines in public investment in crop breeding for rainfed agricul-
ture in developing countries, especially for staple crops such as rice, wheat, maize,
other coarse grains, potatoes, cassava, yams, and sweet potatoes. Contrary to some
expectations, the investment gap for these commodities is not filled by private agri-
cultural research, which focuses mainly on developed country commodities and
commercial crops in developing countries.  The fall in research funding causes fur-
ther declines in productivity growth in rainfed crop areas, particularly in more
marginal areas. Despite rapid migration to cities, the absolute population of mar-
ginal rainfed areas increases, and the slow growth in rainfed productivity is inade-
quate to support these populations. In search of improved incomes, people turn to
slash and burn agriculture, resulting in deforestation in the upper watersheds of
many basins. Deforestation causes rapid increases in erosion and sediment loads in
rivers, in turn causing faster sedimentation of reservoir storage. With a growing cri-
sis in food and water, encroachment into wetlands for both land and water increas-
es drastically.  Encroaching settlements and pollution accelerate degradation of the
integrity and health of aquatic ecosystems. The amount of water reserved for envi-
ronmental purposes—such as minimum instream flows and wetlands mainte-
nance—declines dramatically as unregulated and illegal withdrawals increase.
The cost of building new dams continues to increase rapidly, discouraging new
investment in many proposed dam sites. Governments push forward with plans to
build at other sites but are met with mounting—often violent—opposition from
indigenous groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) calling for a mora-
torium on all dam building given concerns over environmental impacts and the cost
and impact of human resettlement. In the face of these protests and high costs, new
investment in medium and large dams and storage reservoirs is virtually halted; com-
bined with increased sedimentation of existing storage, net water storage declines
in developed countries and in developing countries remains static. 
With surface water supply declining and basin water use efficiency dropping,
farmers turn to faster exploitation of groundwater. Overdrafting of groundwater is
intensified in river basins in northern India, northern China, some countries in
WANA, and in several basins in the western United States compared with BAU.
For several years, rates of groundwater extraction increase, driving down water
tables. But after about 2010, key aquifers in northern China, northern India, and
WANA begin to fail; declining water tables make extraction costs too high for con-
tinued pumping, causing a big drop in groundwater extraction from these regions,
further reducing water availability for all uses. 
As under BAU, the rapid increase in urban populations—particularly in the
burgeoning mega-cities of Asia, Africa, and Latin America—results in rapidly grow-
ing demand for domestic water use. But with tightening budget constraints, gov-
ernments lack public funds to make the investments to extend piped water and
sewage disposal to meet the population influx, and turn instead to a massive but
rushed and inadequately planned privatization of urban water and sanitation serv-
ices. The newly privatized urban water and sanitation firms are unable to hit their
revenue targets because of underestimation of the backlog of investments needed
just to bring the existing system up to grade. Seeking to raise more money, major
price increases for connected households are implemented, but users respond by
increasing unauthorized use of water, leaving revenues inadequate. Firms remain
undercapitalized and do little to connect additional populations to piped water. A
rapidly increasing number and percentage of the urban population must rely on
high-priced water from vendors, or spend many hours fetching often-dirty water
from standpipes and wells—time that is taken from child care and income-earning
opportunities. Both water quantity and quality are inadequate to support healthy
living standards for the growing urban masses that do not have access to piped water
and sewer services, so disease and malnutrition increase dramatically. 
THE SUSTAINABLE WATER USE SCENARIO 
The sustainable water use scenario (SUS) explores the potential for dramatically
increasing environmental water allocations and achieving full connection of all
urban households to piped water and higher per capita domestic water consump-
tion, while maintaining food production at BAU levels. It postulates the achieve-
ment of greater social equity and environmental protection through both careful
market-oriented reform in the water sector and more comprehensive and coordi-
nated government action. This includes greater investment in infrastructure and
water management reform to improve water management efficiency, and investment
in efficiency-and productivity-enhancing water and agricultural technology, par-
ticularly in rainfed areas.
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In the food sector, increased crop research investments, technological change,
and policy and water management reform boost water productivity and crop yield
growth in rainfed agriculture. The high heterogeneity and erratic rainfall of rainfed
environments make plant breeding a difficult task, and until recently, potential cere-
al yield increases appeared limited in the less favorable rainfed areas with poor soils
and harsh environmental conditions. However, accumulating evidence shows dra-
matic increases in yield potential—even in drought-prone and high temperature
rainfed environments—inducing a change in breeding strategy to directly target
rainfed areas rather than relying on “spill-ins” from breeding for irrigated areas as a
key to this faster growth. Increased agricultural research investments in both con-
ventional breeding and in the tools of biotechnology—such as marker-assisted
selection and cell and tissue culture techniques—ultimately lead to improved cere-
al yield growth in rainfed environments. Such growth comes both from incremen-
tal increases in the yield potential and from improved stress resistance including
improved drought tolerance. Yields are further enhanced through participatory
plant breeding that helps tailor new crop varieties to the multitude of rainfed
microenvironments. Improved policies and increased investment in rural infra-
structure helps to exploit remaining yield gaps by linking remote farmers to mar-
kets and reducing the risks of rainfed farming.
In the water sector under SUS, the effective price of water to the agricultural
sector is gradually increased to induce water conservation  and free up agricultural
water for environmental, domestic, and industrial uses.  By 2025 agricultural water
prices are twice as high in developed countries, and three times as high as the very
low levels in developing countries under BAU. These agricultural water price increas-
es are implemented through incentive programs that provide farmers with income
for the water they save, such as negative pricing or charge subsidy schemes that pay
farmers for reducing water use, and through the establishment, purchase, and trad-
ing of water use rights. In cases where direct establishment of water rights to farm-
ers is not feasible (for example, in large rice-based irrigation systems that serve
many small farmers), water rights are established for communities and water user
associations, which, with better knowledge of local farming conditions, pass on the
change in price incentives to their members. The devolution of water rights to com-
munities and water user associations (WUAs) is accompanied in many regions
with turnover of O&M to these groups. The integrated devolution of water rights
and systems results in more effective management of secondary and tertiary irriga-
tion systems. This combination of water rights-based price increases with system
turnover leads farmers to increase their onfarm investment in irrigation and water
management technology significantly. With the public sector increasing direct
investments and farmers and community boosting their private investments, irri-
gation system efficiency and basin water use efficiency increases significantly.  
The successful decentralization of a number of significant water management
functions through community and incentive-based management is supported at the
river basin level with the establishment of effective RBOs for the management of
mainstream water allocation for coordination of stakeholder interests. Higher fund-
ing and reduced water conflicts—a result of the overall improvement in water man-
agement—facilitate effective stakeholder participation in RBOs.
Breakthroughs in water harvesting systems including low-cost, labor-saving
techniques and construction materials for building water catchment bunds and dis-
tributing water induce a more rapid adoption of water harvesting technologies in
developing countries, improving the effective use of rainfall in crop production and
increasing crop evapotranspiration per unit of rainfall. In addition to water har-
vesting, the more rapid adopting of advanced farming techniques helps to conserve
soil and make more effective use of rainfall. While traditional agricultural techniques
have tended to apply the same management to an entire field, precision agriculture
methods focus on information technology using site-specific soil, crop, and other
environmental data to determine specific inputs required for certain sections of
fields. Many of these methods involve the use of technologies like global position-
ing systems (GPS), satellites, and remote sensing. Precision agriculture directly
increases crop yields and also improves water availability through greater relative
infiltration of rainfall. Initially adopted in the United States, it spreads more rap-
idly there and in developed countries given cost-reducing advances in information
and communications technology and begins to penetrate commercial farming in
developing countries including Argentina, Brazil, China, and India. Adoption rates
of other improved techniques also accelerate, including contour plowing and pre-
cision land leveling that act to detain and infiltrate a higher share of the precipita-
tion. Conservation tillage technologies, such as minimum till and no till, that began
to spread in South Asian rice-wheat farming systems in the late twentieth century
continue to expand their coverage. Adoption of conservation tillage practices increas-
es the share of rainfall that goes to infiltration and evapotranspiration. The combi-
nation of water harvesting, precision agriculture, and conservation tillage increases
the effective rainfall used for crop production.
Spurred by the rapidly escalating costs of building new dams and the increas-
ingly apparent environmental and human resettlement costs, developing (and devel-
oped) countries undertake a comprehensive reassessment of reservoir construction
plans involving both new analysis of the costs and benefits of proposed projects—
including environmental externalities—and consultation with multiple stakehold-
ers—including potential beneficiaries such as farmers who would receive new
irrigation water, potential flood control beneficiaries, and those who could be
adversely affected by new dams such as persons who would have to be relocated and
environmental advocacy groups. As a result of this process, a large number of
42 ROSEGRANT, CAI, AND CLINE
POTENTIAL WATER WORLDS      43
planned storage projects are taken off the drawing boards. The cutback is partly com-
pensated by reduced rates of sedimentation of reservoirs given more rapid growth
in rainfed crop yields (see above), which slows the movement of farmers to clear
forests for cultivation in fragile upper watersheds.  
The rapidly increasing cost of groundwater pumping, together with the decline
in water tables, and increasing degradation of overdrafted aquifers induces a signif-
icant change in policy toward groundwater extraction. A combination of market-
based approaches that assign water rights to groundwater based on annual
withdrawals and the renewable stock of groundwater—together with the passage
of stricter regulations and better enforcement of these regulations—results in a phas-
ing-out of all groundwater overdrafting in excess of natural recharge.  
Similar to the case for agricultural water management, dramatic reform is
undertaken in the domestic and industrial water demand sectors. A doubling of
water prices for connected households is phased-in gradually, with targeted subsi-
dies retained for low-income households. The increase in revenue from higher
water prices is invested to reduce water losses in existing water supply systems and
to expand water supply to households that were previously not connected to piped
water systems. In many major cities, water systems are privatized, and additional
investment funds are obtained through private capital markets. In many other
cities, the water supply stays under public management but the regulatory system
is separated from service delivery and is greatly improved. With improved per-
formance, public systems are able to raise the needed new capital through issuance
of municipal bonds or, in the case of smaller cities, bonds backed by regional water-
development boards supported by national general revenues and international
development assistance. The strong evidence that access to clean water dramatical-
ly reduces child malnutrition and mortality motivates this increase in national and
international public funding.   The same findings spur dramatic increases in pub-
lic provision of standpipes in areas that are not yet serviced by piped water, thus
improving access and reducing the price of unconnected water, ultimately boost-
ing water consumption for unconnected households. As water supply expansion
continues, the number of unconnected households declines over time until all
households are connected by 2020. Industries respond to higher prices, particular-
ly in developing countries, by dramatically increasing in-plant recycling of water,
reducing consumptive use of water. The technological backlog on water recycling
in developing countries means that considerable potential for improvement exists,
and industrial demand in response to prices is relatively high.  
With strong societal pressure for improved environmental quality, allocations
for environmental uses of water are increased. Moreover, pressure on wetlands and
on other environmental purposes for water are reduced by many of the reforms
undertaken in the agricultural and nonagricultural water sectors. All water savings
from both domestic and urban water conservation resulting from higher water
prices are fully allocated to instream environmental uses. Improvement in water use
efficiency resulting from higher investment and better water management means
that more water is left instream for environmental purposes.  
SCENARIO SPECIFICATION
The scenarios are implemented in the model through changes in the assumptions
regarding underlying drivers. This section summarizes the projected values of the
drivers for the various scenarios.  
Population and Income Growth
Population and income growth are crucial determinants of water and food supply
and demand. A world population of 3 billion people in 1960 doubled to 6 billion
by 1999, with population growth rates peaking at 2.1 percent annually between
1965 and 1970, and declining progressively since then to 1.4 percent annually
between 1997 and 1998. The population projections in the scenarios are based on
the medium variant UN projections (UN 1998), and are disaggregated over sepa-
rate five-year periods. As noted above, population (and income) projections are the
same across scenarios to focus the analysis on the impact of changes in direct water-
related factors. Projected population for all countries and regions covered in the
model are shown in Table 3.1. Further declines in global population growth rates
are projected, with growth rates declining in later periods as birth rates fall in vir-
tually all regions and declining mortality rates level off. The developing countries
are projected to account for 98 percent of world population growth through 2025.
Despite the impact of HIV/AIDS, the population of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), esti-
mated at 532 million in 1995, is projected to grow at 2.5 percent per year, more
than doubling to 1.1 billion people in 2025. Among other regions, Pakistan, South
Asia, and WANA have relatively high population growth rates. The two most pop-
ulous countries—India and China—will average only 1.3 and 0.6 percent per year,
respectively. Nevertheless, because the population bases of these countries are so
large, they will still account for about 30 percent of the total world population
increase during 1995–2025. 
Closely related to population and income changes is the transformation of
demographic patterns. The most vital of these demographic characteristics, partic-
ularly in terms of projecting future water and food needs in fast-growing economies,
is the rate of urbanization. Urbanization accelerates changes in diet away from
basic staples like sorghum, millet, maize, and root crops, to cereals requiring less
preparation (such as wheat), fruits, livestock products, and processed foods
(Rosegrant et al. 2001). Moreover, urbanization influences the rate of growth in
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Table 3.1Rural, urban, and total population, 1995 and 2025 
1995 baseline estimates (millions) 2025 projections (millions)
Country/Region Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total
United States 64 205 269 58 289 347
European Union 15 80 293 373 56 316 372
Japan 28 98 125 20 104 124
Australia 3 15 18 3 21 24
Other developed countries 32 59 90 27 79 106
Eastern Europe 54 83 137 33 81 114
Central Asia 31 23 54 37 35 72
Rest of former Soviet Union 67 172 239 40 162 202
Mexico 24 67 91 25 105 130
Brazil 34 125 159 26 193 219
Argentina 4 31 35 3 44 47
Colombia 11 28 39 11 48 59
Other Latin America 53 99 152 57 177 234
Nigeria 60 39 99 79 124 203
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 104 29 133 174 114 288
Central and western 
Sub-Saharan Africa 84 47 131 132 150 282
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 55 24 80 75 80 154
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 70 19 89 112 73 184
Egypt 34 27 62 41 54 95
Turkey 19 43 61 12 75 87
Other West Asia/North Africa 
(WANA) 84 127 212 107 275 382
India 679 248 927 777 575 1,352
Pakistan 81 42 124 118 133 251
Bangladesh 97 27 124 125 85 211
Other South Asia 48 10 58 72 35 107
Indonesia 127 70 198 107 166 273
Thailand 47 12 59 50 28 77
Malaysia 9 11 20 9 22 31
Philippines 31 37 68 30 77 107
Viet Nam 59 14 73 73 32 105
Myanmar 33 11 44 34 26 60
Other Southeast Asia 14 3 16 21 10 32
China 857 369 1,226 778 702 1,480
Korea, Republic of 10 35 45 5 47 52
Other East Asia 10 14 24 9 21 29
Rest of the World 5 2 6 7 4 11
Developing countries 2,774 1,634 4,408 3,106 3,510 6,616
Developed countries 327 925 1,251 237 1,051 1,288
World 3,101 2,559 5,659 3,343 4,561 7,903
Sources:  1995 data are from FAO (2000); 2025 data are authors' projections based on UN (1998) medi-
um scenario.
Table 3.2Gross domestic product per capita in 1995 and 2025
Gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita (U.S. dollars)
Projected annual growth 
1995 2025 rate 19952025 
Country/Region baseline estimates projections (percent  per year)
United States 27,700 50,410 2.0
European Union 15 21,820 42,430 2.2
Japan 38,430 76,460 2.3
Australia 19,880 32,400 1.6
Other developed countries 13,830 21,360 1.5
Eastern Europe 2,510 8,430 4.1
Central Asia 950 1,700 2.0
Rest of former Soviet Union 1,970 3,830 2.2
Mexico 3,810 7,710 2.4
Brazil 4,180 8,830 2.5
Argentina 8,210 22,660 3.4
Colombia 2,200 4,330 2.3
Other Latin America 2,090 3,910 2.1
Nigeria 270 450 1.7
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 110 140 0.8
Central and western Sub-Saharan Africa 390 570 1.3
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 450 610 1.0
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 240 350 1.3
Egypt 960 2,030 2.5
Turkey 2,640 6,890 3.2
Other West Asia/North Africa (WANA) 1,630 2,590 1.6
India 360 1,470 4.8
Pakistan 430 840 2.3
Bangladesh 240 660 3.4
Other South Asia 300 610 2.4
Indonesia 1,020 2,760 3.4
Thailand 2,840 10,490 4.5
Malaysia 4,230 12,580 3.7
Philippines 1,090 2,980 3.4
Viet Nam 270 990 4.4
Myanmar 170 390 2.8
Other Southeast Asia 610 1,190 2.3
China 670 3,060 5.2
Korea, Republic of 9,820 36,270 4.5
Other East Asia 610 1,140 2.1
Rest of the World 2,910 5,500 2.1
Sources:  1995 data are from World Bank (2000); 2025 data are authors' projections.
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domestic and industrial water demand, as well as agriculural water demand through
changes in the food demand. Rural-to-urban migration—and its attendant signif-
icant effect on demand structures—increased quite rapidly over the past few decades
throughout the developing world and will continue to grow over the projection peri-
od. About 37 percent of the population of developing countries resided in urban
areas in 1995, up from 22 percent in 1960 and 30 percent in 1980 (Table 3.1 and
World Bank 2000). Urbanization is projected to accelerate in the future, with the
urban population of developing countries more than doubling between 1995 and
2025, while the rural population increases by 12 percent. By 2025, 53 percent of
the population in developing countries will reside in urban areas (Table 3.1).   
GDP per capita in 1995 and 2025 and the annual rate of growth between 1997
and 2025 are shown in Table 3.2. GDP per capita growth rate disparities among
countries in the developing world are projected to remain high. Growth rates will
be highest in Asia, ranging from 2.1 to 5.2 percent per year; with growth rates in
Latin America (LA) of 2.1 to 3.4 percent per year. GDP growth for SSA is projected
to be between 0.8 and 1.7 percent per year between 1995 and 2025, with lower
aggregate growth further suppressed by rapid population growth. 
Water Infrastructure, Policy, and Management
The key drivers influenced by water policy, management, and infrastructure invest-
ment include river basin efficiency, reservoir storage capacity, physical potential irri-
gated area, and allowable water withdrawal.  
Basin Efficiency. Depending on the local conditions in the irrigation system,
agronomic, technical, managerial, and institutional improvements can have large
positive impacts on irrigation system water use efficiencies (Batchelor 1999).
However, improvement in river basin efficiency is more difficult because much of
water “lost” from individual irrigation systems is in the form of return flows that
are reused downstream. Rapid improvement in basin efficiency would require a sig-
nificant commitment to water policy reform and investment—a commitment not
apparent in current trends in the water sector. Under BAU, it is projected that basin
efficiency (BE) will improve relatively slowly. The estimated and projected values
of BE for selected countries and regions in 1995 and 2025 are shown in Table 3.3.
In 1995, the average BE was assessed at 0.56 globally, 0.53 in developing countries,
and 0.64 in developed countries. By 2025, the average BE is projected to reach 0.61
worldwide, 0.59 in developing countries and 0.69 in developed countries, repre-
senting relatively small—but important—improvements over efficiency levels in
1995 (Table 3.3). Relatively high increases in BE are projected for developed and
developing countries in which renewable water supply infrastructure is highly devel-
oped, including India, China, and WANA, while smaller increases are projected for
areas where water supply facilities are relatively underdeveloped, including SSA and
Southeast Asia. Excluding China and India, the developing countries are projected
to display slow improvements in BE, from 0.53 in 1995 to 0.56 in 2025.
Table 3.3Basin efficiency and reservoir storage for irrigation and water sup-
ply under business-as-usual, water crisis, and sustainable water use scenar-
ios,1995 and 2025
Basin efficiency Reservoir storage (km3)
1995 2025 projections 1995 2025 projections
baseline baseline
Country/Basin(s) estimates BAU CRI SUS estimates BAU CRI SUS
Basins in the United States
Ohio and Tennessee 0.61 0.62 0.58 0.65 2 2 2 2
Rio Grande River 0.74 0.78 0.66 0.85 4 4 4 4
Columbia 0.69 0.75 0.64 0.83 18 18 16 18
Colorado 0.82 0.90 0.71 0.90 55 55 48 55
Great Basin 0.71 0.76 0.65 0.86 3 3 3 3
California 0.76 0.84 0.68 0.90 31 31 28 31
Arkansas-White-Red 0.70 0.74 0.65 0.79 20 20 18 20
Mid Atlantic 0.61 0.62 0.58 0.69 8 8 7 8
Mississippi
Downstream 0.67 0.71 0.62 0.77 1 1 1 1
Upstream 0.61 0.64 0.58 0.71 2 2 2 2
Great Lakes 0.61 0.64 0.58 0.73 2 2 2 2
South Atlantic-Gulf 0.61 0.64 0.58 0.68 15 15 13 15
Texas-Gulf 0.73 0.76 0.66 0.83 40 40 35 40
Missouri 0.71 0.76 0.65 0.81 60 60 53 60
United States 263 263 230 263
Basins in China
HuaiHe 0.60 0.67 0.45 0.82 137 156 136 143
HaiHe 0.70 0.78 0.48 0.86 110 117 106 114
HuangHe 0.58 0.64 0.44 0.79 80 98 78 88
ChangJiang 0.52 0.58 0.41 0.79 325 363 327 336
SongLiao 0.54 0.61 0.42 0.81 153 185 153 162
Inland 0.47 0.52 0.38 0.81 38 51 39 45
Southwest 0.47 0.53 0.38 0.78 6 7 6 6
ZhuJiang 0.47 0.53 0.38 0.75 152 173 155 159
Southeast 0.47 0.53 0.39 0.75 63 72 63 68
China 1,064 1,221 1,063 1,122
Basins in India
Sahyadri Ghats Mountains 0.57 0.63 0.43 0.71 16 23 16 19
Eastern Ghats Mountains 0.52 0.56 0.41 0.64 9 14 9 11
Cauvery River Basin 0.52 0.57 0.41 0.69 7 11 7 9
Godavari River Basin 0.53 0.58 0.42 0.65 24 35 24 29
Krishna River Basin 0.53 0.58 0.41 0.67 23 34 23 28
Coastal drainage (Indian) 0.60 0.66 0.45 0.76 19 33 19 25
Chotanagpur Plateau coastal 0.55 0.61 0.43 0.69 4 5 4 4
Brahmari River Basin 0.60 0.66 0.45 0.77 21 36 21 27
Luni River Basin 0.61 0.67 0.45 0.80 21 38 21 28
Mahi Tapti  Narmada, and 
Purna 0.55 0.61 0.42 0.69 17 30 17 22
Brahmaputra River Basin 0.55 0.60 0.42 0.66 2 3 2 3
Indus River Basin 0.55 0.61 0.43 0.75 21 31 21 25
Ganges River Basin 0.59 0.65 0.44 0.75 50 74 50 59
India 232 367 233 287
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Table 3.3Continued
Basin efficiency Reservoir storage (km3)
1995 2025 projections 1995 2025 projections
baseline baseline
Country/Basin(s) estimates BAU CRI SUS estimates BAU CRI SUS
Other countries/regions
European Union 15 0.55 0.58 0.53 0.59 56 61 54 58
Japan 0.56 0.59 0.53 0.61 4 4 4 4
Australia 0.73 0.79 0.65 0.86 65 75 63 70
Other developed countries 0.55 0.60 0.53 0.64 257 274 254 266
Eastern Europe 0.60 0.64 0.56 0.68 28 32 28 32
Central Asia 0.55 0.61 0.42 0.70 93 98 89 98
Rest of former Soviet Union 0.60 0.63 0.44 0.68 122 131 118 131
Mexico 0.51 0.56 0.40 0.64 104 122 101 113
Brazil 0.41 0.42 0.34 0.51 96 108 93 103
Argentina 0.42 0.44 0.35 0.50 60 71 58 67
Colombia 0.41 0.43 0.35 0.50 5 7 5 7
Other Latin America 0.41 0.42 0.35 0.49 99 118 96 107
Nigeria 0.45 0.48 0.37 0.57 37 51 40 51
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.42 0.43 0.35 0.51 16 21 17 21
Central and western 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.45 0.46 0.37 0.65 145 174 153 164
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.49 0.51 0.39 0.60 153 178 160 166
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 0.40 0.42 0.34 0.50 3 4 3 4
Egypt 0.70 0.75 0.57 0.88 146 155 140 151
Turkey 0.60 0.64 0.45 0.74 139 197 144 157
Other West Asia/North Africa 
(WANA) 0.69 0.75 0.57 0.89 32 47 32 37
Pakistan 0.50 0.52 0.40 0.61 21 26 21 24
Bangladesh 0.46 0.47 0.37 0.53 12 17 12 15
Other South Asia 0.43 0.44 0.35 0.50 5 8 5 7
Indonesia 0.46 0.47 0.37 0.55 55 72 55 64
Thailand 0.50 0.53 0.40 0.60 31 38 30 36
Malaysia 0.52 0.55 0.41 0.66 15 19 15 18
Philippines 0.47 0.49 0.38 0.56 2 3 2 2
Viet Nam 0.45 0.48 0.37 0.55 1 2 1 2
Myanmar 0.45 0.47 0.37 0.55 3 5 3 4
Other Southeast Asia 0.50 0.53 0.40 0.64 10 15 10 13
South Korea 0.62 0.65 0.45 0.75 15 20 15 19
Other East Asia 0.42 0.44 0.35 0.50 28 34 28 32
Rest of the World 0.43 0.45 0.36 0.50 8 11 8 10
Developing countries 0.53 0.59 0.57 0.72 2,632 3,209 2,634 2,903
Developed countries 0.64 0.69 0.42 0.69 796 840 751 823
World 0.56 0.61 0.44 0.70 3,428 4,049 3,385 3,727
Source:  IMPACT-WATER projections, 2002.
Notes:  BAU indicates business-as-usual scenario; CRI, water crisis scenario; SUS, sustainable water
use scenario; and km3, cubic kilometers.
Reservoir Storage. For most basins and countries, surface reservoir storage in the
base year is estimated on values from the International Committee of Large Dams
(ICOLD 1998), while ESCAP (1995) provides estimates for non-ICOLD mem-
ber countries. Changes in reservoir storage to 2025 are based on assessments by
Wallingford (2000), and on our estimates of future investments in storage. Reservoir
storage for selected countries and regions in 1995 and for alternative scenarios in
2025 are shown in Table 3.3. The total global reservoir storage for irrigation and
water supply is estimated at 3,428 cubic kilometers in 1995 (47 percent of total
reservoir storage for all purposes), and under BAU, is projected to reach 4,049 cubic
kilometers by 2025, representing a net increase of 621 cubic kilometers over the next
25 years. Only 44 cubic kilometers of the net storage increase will be in developed
countries, with the major increases occurring in China, with a storage increase of
15 percent to 1,221 cubic kilometers; India, with an increase of 58 percent to 367
cubic kilometers; SSA, with an increase of 21 percent to 425 cubic kilometers; Asian
countries excluding China and India, with an increase of 36 percent to 132 cubic
kilometers; and LA, with an increase of 17 percent to 62 cubic kilometers.  
Under CRI, net reservoir storage for irrigation and water supply will stay at
1995 levels for developing countries as a whole, and it will slightly decline (by 2 per-
cent or 40 cubic kilometers) for developed countries from 1995 levels. In 2025,
world reservoir storage for irrigation water supply will be only 3,385 cubic kilo-
meters, 16 percent less than under BAU. Under SUS, the net increase of global reser-
voir storage for irrigation and water supply will be about 300 cubic kilometers, less
than half the increase under BAU. Of this increase, about 19 percent is in China,
18 percent in India, 18 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 45 percent in other coun-
tries and regions.  
Maximum Allowable Water Withdrawals. As described in Chapter 2, actual
water withdrawals are constrained by allowable water withdrawal for surface water
and groundwater. Total allowable water withdrawal in the base year is estimated
based on Gleick (1999), Shiklomanov (1999), and WRI (2000). In the model, pro-
jected allowable water withdrawal is governed by a combination of “hard” infra-
structure constraints such as physical diversion structures and pumping capacities,
and “soft” policy constraints such as the amount of water that must be left instream
for environmental purposes and regulations on groundwater extraction. Maximum
allowable water withdrawals for surface water (SMAWW) and groundwater
(GMAWW) under BAU are projected to 2025, respectively, according to the cur-
rent water withdrawal capacity, the growth of water demand, physical constraints
on pumping, and projected investments in infrastructure in future years. Table 3.4
shows the SMAWW and GMAWW for the 1995 baseline year and projected to
2025 for selected countries and regions under our three primary scenarios.  
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The utilization of groundwater is determined by the change in GMAWW and
groundwater extraction rates relative to GMAWW. Many countries and basins cur-
rently exploit their groundwater reserves at a rate substantially exceeding recharge.
For these “overdrafting” basins, particularly the overexploited aquifers in northern
India, northern China, WANA, and the western United States, a slight decline in
GMAWW is assumed for the baseline.  Conversely, for aquifers worldwide that are
currently underutilized relative to GMAWW, a gradual increase in extraction is pro-
jected under the baseline. 
Under CRI, for countries and river basins currently pumping in excess of
recharge, the growth in extraction continues at BAU rates until 2010. Then, begin-
ning in 2010, a rapid decline in GMAWW begins, until, in 2025, GMAWW
declines to below physical recharge rates, as saltwater intrusion, subsidence of
aquifers, and depth to the declining water table makes it uneconomic to pump
groundwater. For other countries and river basins, where overdrafting is not occur-
ring, the growth in GMAWW and extraction rates under CRI is more rapid than
the same under BAU, as farmers seek to access more water to make up for declin-
ing water use efficiency and declining availability of water from reservoir storage.
The balance of these effects leaves total GMAWW for the developing countries in
2025 virtually the same as under BAU.  
Table 3.4Annual maximum allowable water withdrawal for surface and
groundwater under business-as-usual, water crisis, and sustainable water use
scenarios,1995 and 2025
SMAWW (km3) GMAWW (km3)
1995 2025 projections 1995 2025 projections
baseline baseline
Country/Region estimates BAU CRI SUS estimates BAU CRI SUS
Asia 1,919 2,464 2,926 2,464 478 542 519 389
China 584 764 916 764 138 171 176 137
India 573 735 872 735 237 255 235 163
Southeast Asia 194 286 375 286 22 32 41 32
South Asia excluding India 318 390 444 390 57 58 41 32
Latin America (LA) 251 358 452 358 65 79 90 79
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 73 141 222 141 63 87 109 90
West Asia/North Africa (WANA) 246 302 348 302 72 74 60 45
Developed countries 976 1,131 1,247 1,131 255 278 293 267
Developing countries 2,425 3,197 3,875 3,197 670 773 769 594
World 3,401 4,327 5,122 4,327 925 1,051 1,062 861
Source:  Authors' estimates and IMPACT-WATER projections, 2002.
Notes:  SMAWW indicates surface maximum allowable water withdrawal; GMAWW groundwater maxi-
mum allowable water withdrawal; and km3 indicates cubic kilometers. BAU indicates business-as-usual
scenario; CRI, water crisis scenario; and SUS, sustainable water use scenario.
In the SUS scenario, groundwater overdrafting is phased out over the next 25
years through a reduction in the ratio of annual groundwater pumping to recharge
at the basin or country level to 0.55. Compared with 1995 levels, under SUS,
groundwater pumping in these countries/regions declines by 163 cubic kilometers
including a reduction of 30 cubic kilometers in China, 69 in India, 29 in WANA,
11 in the United States, and 24 cubic kilometers in other countries. The projected
increase in pumping for areas with more plentiful groundwater resources remains
virtually the same as under BAU. For developing countries as a whole under SUS,
allowable groundwater pumping in 2025 falls to 594 cubic kilometers represent-
ing a decline of 11 percent from the value in 1995 and a drop from the 2025 BAU
value of 23 percent (Table 3.4).
Potential Irrigated Area. Two concepts need to be distinguished with respect to
irrigated area: potential irrigated area and actual or realized irrigated area. Potential
irrigated area is the area that can be irrigated in the absence of any water supply con-
straints at the prevailing level of irrigation infrastructure and commodity prices.
Actual irrigated area is the irrigated area harvested under the prevailing hydrologi-
cal conditions in any given year, and is therefore a function of both potential and
available water. Potential and actual irrigated area by crop in 1995 is modeled based
on data from FAO (1999) and Cai and Rosegrant (1999). Projected actual irrigat-
ed area for the three scenarios is reported in the model outcomes in Chapters 4 and
5. Growth rates for potential irrigated area between 1995 and 2025 are estimated
based on FAO (1999) and on our estimation of the impact of investment on expan-
sion in irrigation infrastructure (Rosegrant et al. 2001). For the scenario analysis,
we want to isolate the direct impact of changes in water scarcity on the growth in
actual irrigated area, rather than driving the results by changing the potential area
irrigated. We therefore assume the same potential irrigation water demand by pro-
jecting the same potential irrigated area under each scenario, and allow the endoge-
nous outcomes on irrigation water availability to drive the irrigated area outcome.
Results for actual irrigated area under the three scenarios are provided in Chapters
4 and 5. Table 3.5 shows the 1995 estimated and 2025 projected potential irrigat-
ed area. Potential irrigated area growth is projected to be relatively slow, with a total
increase of 28 million hectares for irrigated cereals by 2025, and an increase in poten-
tial irrigated area for all crops from 375 million hectares in 1995 to 441 million
hectares in 2025. 
Environmental, Ecological, and Navigational Flow Commitments. Committed
flow is estimated as a portion of total renewable water, depending on availability of
runoff and relative demands of these instream uses in different basins. Some basins
already have legislative requirements for environmental and instream flows. In the
California water basin in the model, for example, legal committed flows represent
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46 percent of renewable water. In river basins that have high hydropower genera-
tion and navigation requirements, the fraction of committed flow is relatively high.
For example, in 1995, the estimate is 48 percent for Yangtze River Basin in China
and 45 percent for Brazil. In the dry areas in developing countries, the committed
flow is as low as 6 percent, and generally varies from 15 to 30 percent (Table 3.6).  
For the BAU scenario, the fraction of renewable water committed to environ-
mental, ecological, and navigational flow is assumed to remain constant through
2025. Under the other two scenarios, committed flows remain at BAU levels
through 2000, then decrease or increase. Under CRI, the minimum flow commit-
ted to environmental use in developing countries declines significantly as farmers
and urban water supply systems seek to exploit additional water from rivers and wet-
lands to counteract declining basin efficiency and water storage.  In most develop-
ing countries, committed flows fall to half to one-third of BAU levels. For example,
in dry areas in China, the minimum flow committed to environmental use is only
about 5–7 percent of the total renewable water, and in dry areas in India, the com-
mitted flow is below 5 percent (Table 3.6). Under SUS, the committed flows
increase by five to ten percentage points compared with BAU, and are three to four
times higher than under CRI. 
Table 3.5Potential irrigated area under the business-as-usual scenario, 1995 and
2025
Cereals (million ha) Other crops (million ha) Total (million ha)
1995 2025 1995 2025 1995 2025
baseline BAU baseline BAU baseline BAU
Country/Region estimates projections estimates projections estimates projections
Asia 157.0 175.3 74.5 99.6 231.5 274.9
China 64.1 69.3 27.4 38.4 91.5 107.7
India 38.3 48.0 20.7 28.3 59.0 76.3
Southeast Asia 19.2 20.8 5.6 7.3 24.8 28.1
South Asia excluding 
India 20.0 21.4 9.3 13.5 29.3 34.9
Latin America (LA) 7.8 10.2 9.0 11.8 16.8 22.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) 3.3 5.0 21.7 26.5 25.0 31.6
West Asia/North Africa 
(WANA) 12.6 14.7 13.1 16.6 25.6 31.3
Developed countries 46.2 48.2 36.2 38.5 82.4 86.7
Developing countries 176.7 201.6 116.3 152.6 293.0 354.1
World 222.9 249.8 152.5 191.1 375.4 440.8
Source:  Authors' estimates and IMPACT-WATER projections, 2002.
Notes: BAU indicates business-as-usual scenario; million ha, million hectares.
Table 3.6Minimum committed flow for environment as percent of annual total
renewable water under business-as-usual, water crisis, and sustainable water
use scenarios,1995 and 2025
1995 baseline 2025 projections
Region/Country/Basins estimates BAU CRI SUS
Basins in the United States
Ohio and Tennessee 35 35 35 40
Rio Grande River 20 20 20 23
Columbia 35 35 35 40
Colorado 16 16 16 18
Great Basin 30 30 30 35
California 25 25 25 29
Arkansas-White-Red 30 30 30 35
Mid Atlantic 30 30 30 35
Mississippi
Downstream 30 30 30 35
Upstream 35 35 35 40
Great Lakes 30 30 30 35
South Atlantic-Gulf 30 30 30 35
Texas-Gulf 25 25 25 29
Missouri 30 30 30 35
Basins in China
HuaiHe 25 25 7 30
HaiHe 25 25 7 30
HuangHe 27 27 19 32
ChangJiang 45 45 24 50
SongLiao 30 30 11 36
Inland 15 15 5 18
Southwest 35 35 16 42
ZhuJiang 35 35 15 42
Southeast 30 30 15 36
Basins in India
Sahyadri Ghats Mountains 10 10 4 13
Eastern Ghats Mountains 10 10 4 13
Cauvery River Basin 10 10 4 13
Godavari River Basin 10 10 4 13
Krishna River Basin 10 10 4 13
Coastal drainage (Indian) 6 6 2 8
Chotanagpur Plateau coastal 6 6 2 8
Brahmari River Basin 6 6 2 8
Luni River Basin 6 6 2 8
Mahi Tapti  Narmada, and Purna 15 15 5 19
Brahmaputra River Basin 15 15 5 19
Indus River Basin 10 10 4 13
Ganges River Basin 15 15 5 19
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Table 3.6Continued
1995 baseline 2025 projections
Region/Country/Basins estimates BAU CRI SUS
Other countries and regions
European Union 15 45 45 45 54
Japan 30 30 11 38
Australia 23 23 23 28
Other developed countries 35 35 35 44
Eastern Europe 25 25 9 31
Central Asia 28 28 9 34
Rest of former Soviet Union 28 28 10 35
Mexico 25 25 7 31
Brazil 45 45 14 54
Argentina 30 30 11 38
Colombia 35 35 12 44
Other Latin America 35 35 11 44
Nigeria 10 10 4 13
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 10 10 4 13
Central and western Sub-Saharan Africa 25 25 9 31
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 35 35 11 44
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 30 30 11 38
Egypt 16 16 6 18
Turkey 20 20 7 25
Other West Asia/North Africa (WANA) 15 15 5 19
Pakistan 20 20 7 25
Bangladesh 30 30 11 35
Other South Asia 25 25 9 31
Indonesia 35 35 11 40
Thailand 25 25 9 31
Malaysia 30 30 11 38
Philippines 20 20 7 25
Viet Nam 25 25 9 31
Myanmar 30 30 11 35
Other Southeast Asia 30 30 11 35
South Korea 25 25 7 31
Other East Asia 25 25 9 31
Rest of the World 25 25 9 31
Source: Authors' estimates and IMPACT-WATER projections, 2002.
Notes:  BAU indicates business-as-usual scenario; CRI, water crisis scenario; and SUS, sustainable
water use scenario.
Table 3.7Percentage of households with access to piped water under busi-
ness-as-usual, water crisis, and sustainable water use scenarios,1995 and 2025
Rural households Urban households
1995 2025 projections 1995 2025 projections
baseline baseline
Country/Region estimates BAU CRI SUS estimates BAU CRI SUS
United States 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
European Union 15 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Japan 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Australia 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Other developed countries 81 90 100 100 97 98 78 100
Eastern Europe 51 89 71 100 94 97 86 100
Central Asia 78 86 70 100 97 100 66 100
Rest of former Soviet Union 97 97 92 100 98 98 100 100
Mexico 30 69 32 100 86 92 61 100
Brazil 39 70 49 100 85 88 61 100
Argentina 30 61 36 100 85 97 64 100
Colombia 52 62 52 100 96 99 62 100
Other Latin America 56 75 57 100 84 91 53 100
Nigeria 36 69 31 100 80 88 33 100
Northern Sub-Saharan Africa 17 51 12 100 74 90 24 100
Central and western 
Sub-Saharan Africa 30 51 21 100 66 77 24 100
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa 43 68 35 100 81 88 32 100
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa 40 74 28 100 83 88 29 100
Egypt 86 97 83 100 97 95 54 100
Turkey 70 88 90 100 82 92 55 100
Other West Asia/North Africa 
(WANA) 57 85 47 100 92 94 50 100
India 11 47 13 100 66 90 36 100
Pakistan 28 56 32 100 86 97 37 100
Bangladesh 36 69 36 100 80 87 32 100
Other South Asia 33 63 24 100 62 77 21 100
Indonesia 48 75 61 100 82 92 45 100
Thailand 73 93 76 100 86 97 43 100
Malaysia 94 97 97 100 100 98 55 100
Philippines 68 91 74 100 89 95 53 100
Viet Nam 45 84 43 100 81 88 39 100
Myanmar 39 68 39 100 65 79 33 100
Other Southeast Asia 17 47 12 100 55 74 19 100
China 21 70 27 100 63 85 40 100
Korea, Republic of 70 88 86 100 76 92 62 100
Other East Asia 90 92 90 100 93 94 68 100
Rest of the World 39 66 29 100 74 83 33 100
Developing countries 29 64 30 100 76 89 43 100
Developed countries 89 97 95 100 99 99 97 100
World 35 66 34 100 85 92 55 100
Source: Authors' estimates based on WHO and UNICEF (2000) and IMPACT-WATER projections, 2002.
Notes: BAU indicates business-as-usual scenario; CRI, water crisis scenario; and SUS, sustainable
water use scenario.
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Domestic Water Access
Household access to piped water in 1995 is estimated at 29 percent in rural areas
and 76 percent for urban areas in developing countries.4 The detailed breakdown
of household access by country is shown in Table 3.7. Under BAU, access to piped
water is projected to increase to 64 percent in rural areas and 89 percent in urban
areas in developing countries. Under CRI, it is assumed that there will be no
increase in the number of households with access to piped water after 2000, so there
will be a significant decline in the percentage of households connected compared
with BAU. The rural access to piped water will therefore be only 30 percent in 2025
and the urban access 43 percent in developing countries, less than half the 2025 lev-
els under BAU. In sharp contrast, under SUS it is assumed that all domestic house-
holds attain full access to piped water beginning in 2020 (Table 3.7).
Water Prices
Under BAU, real water prices are projected to change little, increasing by ten per-
cent between 1995 and 2025. Under CRI, the real effective water price for indus-
trial and connected domestic households increases gradually to 2020, reaching 50
percent and 25 percent higher than BAU prices in the developing and the devel-
oped world, respectively. No change is projected for agricultural water prices and
unconnected household water prices compared with BAU. 
Under SUS, water prices are increased more dramatically. In the industrial sec-
tor, water prices increase gradually from 2000 to 2025; in developed countries they
are 75 percent higher than BAU prices by 2025; and in developing countries they
are 125 percent higher. In the agriculture sector, where 1995 water prices are very
low particularly in the developing countries, price increases are also phased in, and
by 2025 are double the BAU prices in developed countries and three times the BAU
prices in developing countries. In the domestic sector, for connected households,
water price increases gradually increase from 2000 to 2020, reaching a level 40 per-
cent higher than BAU prices in developed countries, and 80 percent higher in devel-
oping countries. For unconnected households, water prices are far higher in 1995
than for connected households. Under SUS, these unconnected water prices grad-
ually decline, converging toward the connected price as higher prices for connect-
ed households and industry free up water that is accessed by unconnected
households. After 2020, the prevailing water prices are 50 percent higher than the
BAU connected water price in developed countries, and twice the BAU connected
water price in developing countries for all households in the domestic sector, which
by that time are 100 percent connected (see above).
Rainfed Crop Yield
Crop yields in the model are determined by the rates of technological change result-
ing from investment in crop research and crop management, by the prevailing crop
prices, and by the availability of water. The crop price and water availability effects
on crop yields are determined endogenously in the model simulations, while the
effect of technological change is projected exogenously as a key driver. The rate of
technological change in crop yield growth in irrigated areas is assumed to be the same
across the scenarios. This assumption is made so that, in irrigated crop production,
the changes in crop yield are determined only by the direct impacts of changes in
water availability and the feedback effects of crop price changes.  
However, the rates of technological change in rainfed crop yields are assumed
to vary across the three scenarios, following their three different narratives. Under
CRI, it is assumed that rainfed crop yields grow at a rate that is 25 percent less than
yield growth under BAU (that is, if the BAU growth rate in crop yield is 1.00 per-
cent per annum, the growth rate under CRI is set at 0.75 percent per annum).
Under SUS, rainfed crop yield growth is assumed to be 25 to 50 percent higher than
under BAU, with the bigger increases in growth rates occurring in the more water
scarce areas.  
Water Harvesting and Effective Rainfall
Under BAU, it is projected that effective rainfall use for rainfed crops will increase
3–5 percent by 2025 because of improved water harvesting and onfarm water man-
agement, as well as varietal improvements that shift crop growth periods to better
utilize rainfall. Under CRI, it is assumed that there is no improvement in effective
rainfall use, with levels remaining the same as in 1995.
Under SUS, a more rapid phased improvement in effective rainfall use occurs
compared with BAU. In those basins/countries with severe rainwater shortages for
crop production, including river basins in the western United States, northern and
western China, northern and western India, and countries in northern SSA and
WANA, effective rainfall use increases by 10–15 percent between 1995 and 2025.
For other regions that face less severe water shortages, the increase in effective rain-
fall use ranges from 5–10 percent.
This chapter has sketched the backdrop, in narrative and quantitative terms,
for three very different—but highly plausible—scenarios for the future water and
food situation. Chapters 4 and 5 provide a detailed assessment of the impact of these
different policies, investments, and management choices on water supply and
demand, food production and demand, prices, and trade. Chapter 4 analyzes out-
comes under the business-as-usual scenario, then Chapter 5 presents results under
the water crisis and sustainable water use scenarios, comparing them with BAU lev-
els to quantify the differences. 
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NOTES
1. Gallopin and Rijsberman (2001) make the important point that the con-
struction and interpretation of a scenario are influenced by the beliefs and the-
oretical assumptions of the analyst. The account of the mechanisms leading to
alternative scenarios and judgment of the efficacy of alternative actions are guid-
ed by one's analytical understanding. The narrative storyline is inherently sub-
jective; therefore, we believe that the ultimate plausibility of the scenarios rests
fundamentally on the plausibility of their quantification within the model so
as to capture the range of outcomes. 
2. For a detailed analysis of more comprehensive alternative scenarios for the
food sector, see Rosegrant et al. 2001.
3. Drivers are not further subdivided among technology, management, and infra-
structure because the outcomes on the drivers are a function of all three of these
factors. 
4. Estimates for access to piped water in 1995 include access to in-house piped
water and standpipes because comprehensive data was unavailable for house-
holds with in-house piped connections. Thus the percentage of households with
access to piped water (connected households) is higher than typically cited for
household connections. 1995 estimates of per capita water consumption for
each group (see Chapter 4) have been adjusted accordingly.
